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Abstract—Existing microgrid communication relies on classi-
cal public key systems, which are vulnerable to attacks from
quantum computers. This paper uses quantum key distribution
(QKD) to solve these quantum-era microgrid challenges. Specif-
ically, this paper makes the following novel contributions: 1) it
offers a QKD-based microgrid communication architecture for
microgrids; 2) it shows how to build a quantum-secure microgrid
testbed in an RTDS environment; 3) it develops a key pool
sharing (KPS) strategy to improve the cyberattack resilience of
the QKD-based microgrid; and 4) it analyzes the impacts of
critical QKD parameters with the testbed. Test results provide
insightful resources for building a quantum-secure microgrid.
Index Terms—Microgrid, quantum key distribution, quantum
computer, cyber security, communication, testbed
I. INTRODUCTION
SECURING data transmission in microgrid is crucial formaintaining normal grid operations and achieving desir-
able benefits, e.g., fast recovery during a main grid black-
out, improved system reliability and resilience, and economic
power supply to customers [1], [2]. Existing methods on
this topic largely rely on cryptographic systems such as the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [3]. AES and similar
methods use a key for all encryptions within a given time
period [4]. It therefore requires that the key, which is pre-
shared by two parties, has to be kept secret. This secure key
distribution process is mostly achieved by public-key cryp-
tographic methods such as the Diffie-Hellman key exchange
(DH) [5] and Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) [6].
However, the security of all classical public key systems is
only guaranteed based on the assumed limits on an adversary’s
power. For instance, some mathematical problems such as the
discrete logarithm problem [7] or the factoring problem [8]
cannot be effectively solved even by the fastest modern com-
puters using any existing algorithms [9]. These assumptions
however are still unproven, and if proven false, the current
cryptographic systems will no longer be secure [10].
Further, even if these assumptions remain true, the develop-
ment of quantum computers will lead to security breaks [11],
[12]. Quantum computing promises to efficiently solve math-
ematical problems by using quantum-mechanical phenomena
such as superposition [13] and entanglement [14]. Note that
although today’s quantum computers are still noisy and their
advent on a scale large enough to break current cryptographic
systems is perhaps still decades away, their sudden appearance
will leave microgrid stakeholders little time to adapt.
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A potent solution to tackle this quantum-era challenge is the
use of quantum key distribution (QKD) [15]. It uses laws of
quantum mechanics to securely generate keys for two parties.
Because those laws have been fairly heavily tested, they pro-
vide a more solid foundation than computational assumptions.
However, although QKD has been widely applied in such areas
like computer networks [16], online banking [17], and ATM
transactions [18], the microgrid community is unfortunately
largely silent on the topic of developing a quantum-secure
microgrid. Part of the reason for this stems from the fact
that the existing QKD systems cannot be directly applied in
microgrid. With multiple communication channels and differ-
ent transmission requirements existing in microgrid, it was
unclear how QKD performs and whether it is applicable under
various circumstances. A real-time QKD-integrated microgrid
simulation testbed for evaluating the performance of the QKD-
based microgrid is essential but does not yet exist.
Further, the key generation speed in a QKD system is
affected by a number of variables like the distance between
two communicating parties and the noise, which can be
either natural or caused by an adversary, on quantum optic
equipment. A large distance or a strong attack on the QKD
equipment can reduce this speed, detrimentally causing keys
to be exhausted. A proper strategy is significantly needed to
enhance the cyberattack resilience for the system.
To bridge the gaps, in this paper, we develop a QKD-
integrated microgrid testbed in Real Time Digital Simulator
(RTDS). Key components like hardware connection, commu-
nication network, and QKD integration are designed and pre-
sented in detail. This is an important step towards constructing
a realistic QKD-enabled microgrid in practice. The real-time
communication between the RTDS simulator and a remote
server enabled by the QKD algorithm is the salilent feature of
this testbed. Main contributions of this paper are fourfold:
• A novel QKD-enabled communication architecture is
devised for microgrids.
• A QKD-integrated microgrid testbed is built in RTDS.
Key components like hardware connection, communica-
tion network, and QKD integration are presented.
• A key pool sharing (KPS) strategy is designed to further
enhance the system’s resilience to cyberattacks.
• The impacts of critical QKD parameters like quantum
fiber length, data transmission speed, attack level, and
detection efficiency are evaluated with the testbed.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
describes quantum communication, and presents the design
of the QKD-based microgrid architecture and KPS strategy.
Section III elaborates the testbed design. Our evaluation results
are reported in Section IV, and Section V concludes the paper.
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2II. QUANTUM-SECURE MICROGRID ENABLED BY QKD
In this section, we first briefly introduce the topic of quan-
tum communication, including the quantum states, the general
setting of a QKD system, and a practical QKD protocol. We
then present the benefits of using QKD for microgrids and
propose a QKD-based microgrid communication architecture.
At the end, we present our novel KPS strategy for improving
the system’s cyberattack resilience.
A. Quantum Communication
Unlike classical secure key distribution systems that rely on
mathematical assumptions, quantum communication utilizes
a radically different foundation: the uncertainty principle of
quantum physics. In this subsection, a brief overview of quan-
tum communication is presented, including an introduction to
quantum states, the general setting of a QKD system, and the
practical QKD protocol used in this paper.
1) Quantum States: Instead of using binary bits to encode
information as in classical communication systems, quantum
communication utilizes quantum states, or “qubits”. A qubit
is a two-state quantum-mechanical system, whose state is
commonly represented by the spin of an electron or the
polarization of a photon. Unlike a binary bit, which has to
be in one state or the other, a qubit can be in a coherent
superposition of both states [19]. For QKD systems, photons
are the primary practical implementation of qubits. For the
QKD system we consider, the polarization of the photon will
be used to encode a quantum state. We will consider two
Bases, namely horizontal polarization (denoted the Z basis
later) and diagonal polarization (denoted the X basis later).
If a source and its receiver both operate in the same basis,
information can be transmitted deterministically; however, if
different bases are used, the information received will be
uncorrelated with the transmitted information. The security
of a QKD protocol, in a way, takes advantage of this: by
encoding a classical bit string using different, randomly-
chosen bases, an adversary who is unaware of the basis choice
can never be truly certain of the information being transmitted.
Furthermore, any attempt to actually learn this information
causes noise in the quantum channel which may be detected
by the users later.
2) General Setting: The general setting of a QKD-based
communication system consists of a quantum channel and a
classical one. The quantum channel allows two parties to share
quantum signals for creating a secure and secret key. With the
created key, the information to be transmitted is encrypted and
later decrypted over the classical channel. The key generation
rate of a QKD protocol is an important statistic and is affected
by numerous parameters, most importantly the noise in the
quantum channel (caused, perhaps, by an adversary or natural
noise) and the distance between the two parties.
An important and unique property of QKD is that the two
parties can detect when an eavesdropper is trying to gain
knowledge of the key. This is due to the quantum-mechanical
property that measuring an unknown quantum state will, in
general, change that state. This ensures that a non-secret
key will never be used, making QKD-based encryption and
authentication theoretically secure. It is worth noting that QKD
is only used to generate the key in the quantum channel; the
message data is still transmitted using classical encryption
methods over the classical channel. In reality, QKD can be
associated with either one-time pad (OTP) or symmetric key
algorithms such as AES.
3) Practical QKD Protocol: Different protocols have been
proposed to implement QKD such as the well-known BB84,
decoy-state, six-state, Ekert91, and BBM92. In this paper, we
consider a practical decoy-state QKD protocol [20], [21]. This
protocol has been one of the most widely used schemes in the
QKD community because of its ability to tolerate high channel
loss and to operate robustly even with today’s hardware.
Its security and feasibility have been well-demonstrated by
several experimental groups, and theoretical security analyses
including the evaluation of concise and tight finite-key security
bounds have also been provided.
The idea of this protocol is as follows: The information is
encoded into qubits and then sent out by one party, commonly
named Alice, using weak coherent laser pulses. With today’s
technology, the production of a single qubit is not practi-
cal; instead, weak coherent laser pulses are used. However,
these pulses contain, with non-zero probability, multiple qubit
signals that would cause a break in security. To tackle this
challenge, the decoy-state protocol varies the intensity of each
laser pulse randomly using one of three intensities k1, k2
and k3, which are the intensities of the signal state, decoy
state and vacuum state, respectively. Two bases X and Z are
selected with probabilities px and 1− px, respectively. Recall
that these bases refer to the polarization setting of the qubit.
The other party, named Bob, measures the qubits by randomly
selecting bases from X and Z. If Alice and Bob choose the
same basis, they share information since sending and receiving
qubits in the same basis, as mentioned, leads to a deterministic
outcome; otherwise, the iteration is discarded. By repeating
this numerous times, the two parties share a so-called raw-
key, which is partially correlated and partially secret. Error
correction is then performed (leaking additional information
to the adversary which must be taken into account) followed
by privacy amplification, yielding a secret key of size `. One is
often interested in the key generation rate `/N , where N is the
number of signals needed to produce a raw-key of sufficient
size for generating the secret key of size `.
Specifically, the procedures of this protocol are described
below [21]:
• Step 1: Preparation. Alice selects a bit value from 0
and 1 uniformly at random; a basis from X and Z
with probabilities px and 1 − px, respectively; and an
intensity from k1, k2 and k3 with probabilities pk1 , pk2
and pk3 = 1 − pk1 − pk2 , respectively. Based on the
selected values, Alice prepares a laser pulse and sends
it to Bob through the quantum channel. Note that Alice
sends Bob the information qubit by qubit.
• Step 2: Measurement. When Bob receives the qubits from
Alice, for each qubit he randomly selects a basis from X
and Z with probabilities px and 1− px, respectively. He
then decodes the qubit using the selected basis.
3• Step 3: Basis reconciliation. Alice announces the basis
and intensity choices, and Bob announces the basis
choices. Note that, this is done after the qubits are
received by Bob. Due to the no-cloning theorem [22], this
information is no longer helpful to the eavesdropper as
she could not copy the originally-sent qubits to measure
now. The raw-key bits are extracted from the events where
Alice and Bob both select the X basis.
• Step 4: Generation of the raw key and the error estima-
tion. Alice and Bob generate a raw key pair (XA, XB)
by using all events where they chose the X basis. Events
from the Z basis are used for quantum error estimation.
• Step 5: Post-processing. Alice and Bob execute an error
correction algorithm trying to correct for a predetermined
error rate. To ensure that the error correction has been
successful and that they have shared identical keys,
they perform an error verification using hash functions.
Finally, they perform a privacy amplification to extract a
secret key pair.
Once all the post-processing procedures have been success-
fully completed, the key is established and can be used by
Alice and Bob. The length ` of the extracted secret key can
be obtained in the following way [21]:
` = bξX,0 + ξX,1 − ξX,1h(φX)− λec − 6 log2
21
εs
− log2
2
εc
c, (1)
where h(x) = −x log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) is the binary
entropy function. ξX,0, ξX,1, and φX are the number of
vacuum events, the number of single-photon events, and the
phase error rate associated with the single-photon events in
XA, respectively. εc is the probability that the keys extracted
by the two parties are not identical, and εs is the user-specified
maximum failure probability. λec specifies how much informa-
tion leaked during error correction. It is set to nXηech(φX),
where nX is the size of the raw key XA, and ηec is the error-
correction efficiency.
The above parameters cannot be directly observed; however,
by using the decoy-state protocol, they can be bounded. Let
nX,k be the number of X signals received using intensity k.
Then, of course, nX , the size of the raw key, is simply the
sum of all nX,k over all the intensities used. Basically, the
number of vacuum events in XA, ξX,0, satisfies
ξX,0 ≥ χ0
k2n
−
X,k3
− k3n+X,k2
k2 − k3 , (2)
where χn is the probability that Alice sends a n-photon state.
This value, using a weak-coherent laser, follows a Poisson
distribution and is found to be:
χn =
∑
k∈{k1,k2,k3}
e−kknpk/n!, (3)
and
n±X,k =
ek
pk
(nX,k ±
√
nX
2
ln
21
εs
), ∀k ∈ {k1, k2, k3}. (4)
The number of single-photon events in XA, ξX,1, satisfies
ξX,1 ≥
χ1k1[n
−
X,k2
− n+X,k3 −
k22−k23
k21
(n+X,k1 −
ξX,0
χ0
)]
k1(k2 − k3)− k22 + k23
. (5)
TABLE I
INITIAL VALUES OF THE PARAMETERS IN THE QKD SYSTEM
k1 k2 k3 pk1 pk2 pk3
0.4 0.1 0.007 1/3 1/3 1/3
nX px pdc pap ηBob emis
107 0.8 6×10−7 4×10−2 0.1 5×10−4
L (km) ηec εc εs
5 1.16 10−11 10−11
Similarly, by using (2)-(5) with statistics from the basis Z,
the number of vacuum events in ZA, ξZ,0, and the number of
single-photon events in ZA, ξZ,1, can also be obtained.
The phase error rate of the single-photon events in XA, φX ,
satisfies [23],
φX ≤ δZ,1
ξZ,1
+ f(εs,
δZ,1
ξZ,1
, ξZ,1, ξX,1), (6)
where
f(a, b, c, d) =
√
(c+ d)(1− b)b
cd log 2
log2(
c+ d
cd(1− b)b
441
a2
), (7)
and δZ,1 is the number of bit errors of the single-photon events
in ZA. It is given by
δZ,1 ≤ χ1
m+Z,k2 −m−Z,k3
k2 − k3 , (8)
where
m±Z,k =
ek
pk
(mZ,k ±
√
mZ
2
ln
21
εs
), ∀k ∈ {k1, k2, k3}, (9)
and mZ =
∑
k∈{k1,k2,k3}mZ,k. Here, mZ,k is the number of
error events in the Z basis. For more details on how the size
of the secret key ` is computed through the above equations,
readers are referred to [21].
The above equations are general for any observations. For
our simulation, we will assume a standard fiber channel and
practical settings for devices. In this case, the probability of
having a bit error for intensity k, bk, is as follows [24]:
bk = pdc + emis(1− e−ηtrk) + paprk
2
, (10)
where pdc and pap are the dark count probability and the after-
pulse probability, respectively. emis is the error rate due to
optical errors. ηtr is the transmittance that is related to the
fiber length L as follows:
ηtr = 10
−0.2L/10, (11)
where the fibers are assumed to have an attenuation coefficient
of 0.2 dB/km. In (10), rk is the expected detection rate
(excluding after-pulse contributions), and can be calculated as
follows:
rk = 1− (1− 2pdc)e−ηchηBobk, (12)
where ηBob is Bob’s detection efficiency.
In this paper, the initial values of the parameters from (1)-
(12) are given in Table I.
B. Benefits of Using QKD for Microgrids
QKD has been envisioned as one of the most secure
and practical instances of quantum cryptography. Specifically,
using QKD provides the following benefits for microgrid:
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Fig. 1. QKD-enabled quantum-secure microgrid communication architecture.
• The key generated by QKD in microgrid is almost
impossible to steal even in the face of an adversary with
infinite supplies of time and processing power.
• QKD is a particularly good method for producing a long
random key, which makes the OTP much more realistic
in practice. When QKD is combined with one-time pads
(OTPs), both th k y generation and the encryption
processes are unconditionally secure.
• A QKD-enabled microgrid is able to detect the presence
of an eavesdropper trying to gain knowledge of the key,
whereas existing communication systems without this
ability will inevitably require extra detection mechanisms.
• QKD systems have the advantage of being automatic
compared with manually distributing keys in microgrid.
C. Quantum-Secure Microgrid Communication Architecture
Given the great benefits described above, we present a
QKD-based communication architecture for microgrids. As
illustrated in Fig. 1, the microgrid control center (MGCC)
collects data from different loads and sends control signals
to local controllers. As building a quantum channel is really
costly, it is practical and reasonable to implement QKD for
only those critical communication channels in microgrid. In
this study, without loss of generality, a QKD-based quantum
channel is built between the MGCC and the local controller for
a battery’s storage. This battery uses a P-Q control to adjust
its power output based on real and reactive power references
received from the MGCC. It is worth noting that, QKD is only
used for generating keys for two parties in an unconditional
secure way; the data encryption process is still achieved using
classical cryptographic methods such as AES or OTP. Using
AES to encrypt data is considered quantum-secure, as long as
the key used for this process is secure [25]. OTP is even more
secure (or more accurately, unconditionally secure), because
it uses a random key only once and then discards the key. But
this requires that the key be as long as the plaintext. Keys
generated by a QKD link are stored in a key pool, and when
there is a need to transfer data, a certain number of key bits
are extracted for encryption and decryption purposes.
To properly integrate QKD into microgrid, a critical concern
is key generation speed in a QKD system. It has to be larger
than the frequency of data transmission to guarantee there are
always enough keys in the key pool. Critical QKD parameters
that affect the key generation speed include quantum fiber
length, attack level, and receiver’s detection efficiency.
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Fig. 2. An example of the KPS strategy.
Different with other applications where there is no strict
requirement on the frequency of data transmission, microgrid
often needs a high frequency of continuous data transmis-
sion to accommodate fast and dynamic changes typically
caused by customers or various distributed energy resources
(DERs). Thus, before constructing a real QKD system in
microgrid, building a real-time simulation testbed to evaluate
the performance of the QKD-enabled microgrid under different
circumstances is an important step. In this paper, we show
in detail how to build a QKD-integrated microgrid testbed
in RTDS, a real-time power system simulator. To maintain
normal operations of the QKD-enabled microgrid when the
key bits in a key pool are used up (this may be caused by
increased data transmission frequency or a strong attack), we
further develop a key pool sharing (KPS) strategy.
D. The KPS Strategy
The idea of this strategy is as follows: The MGCC estab-
lishes multiple quantum channels with local controllers and
uses separate key pools to store keys. Key pools can share
keys with each other, meaning that, when the number of key
bits in one key pool is below a pre-determined threshold, a
certain number of key bits can be shared from other key pools.
An example of the KPS strategy is illustrated in Fig. 2,
where two quantum channels are established between the
MGCC and two local controllers. When the number of key
bits in key pool #1 is lower than a threshold, for instance, a
string of key bits is extracted from key pool #2 by the MGCC
(represented in 1 in Fig. 2). This key bit string is then used
as plaintext (represented in 2 in Fig. 2), encrypted by the
MGCC via a key extracted from key pool #1 (note that there
are still some key bits left in key pool #1), and sent to local
controller #1. Local controller #1 uses the same key from key
pool #1 to decrypt the received message and obtains the key
bit string (represented in 3 in Fig. 2). In this way, a string of
key bits is transferred from key pool #2 and is securely shared
between the MGCC and local controller #1. Although this
distribution of keys through AES loses information-theoretic
security, it is still better than relying on public key systems,
because, as mentioned, AES is considered quantum-secure as
long as the key used for the encryption is secure [25]. Note
that, unlike an alternative approach employing AES keys for
actual data transmission (changing the key every n seconds),
our KPS system has the advantage that information theoretic
OTP may be used up until the last 128 or 256 bits are
available maximizing security of the overal system (switching
to computational security only as a last-resort).
Overhead analysis: The communication and computation
overheads of our KPS strategy are negligible. Assuming the
microgrid control signals with a total size of 200k bits that
need to be transmitted within 20 seconds, then 200k bits
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Fig. 3. Testbed setup for a quantum-secure microgrid in RTDS environment.
of quantum keys are used to encrypt the data. The required
bandwidth for transmitting those key bits from the MGCC to
a local controller is therefore only 10 Kbps, which is far less
than the link capacity of a common switch (i.e., 1 Gbps). On
the other hand, practical encryption schemes such as 128-bit
AES can be utilized to transmit quantum keys, where only
a few key bits are consumed for encrypting a large number
of bits (e.g., 128 bits for a 1500-byte packet). The processing
time of the 128-bit AES encryption with the current computing
hardware is small. A commercial server with four cores could
process AES data with a speed up to 2,804 MB/s [26].
III. QUANTUM-SECURE MICROGRID TEST ENVIRONMENT
A. High-Level Design
The test environment is illustrated in Fig. 3. Specifically,
the microgrid model is developed and compiled in RSCAD, a
power system simulation software designed to interact with the
RTDS simulation hardware. The RTDS in our testbed consists
of three racks, which can be either used separately for small-
scale power systems or combined together to provide more
cores for a large-scale system. In our simulation, rack 2 is
utilized to simulate the microgrid model in real-time, where
the four cores in that rack (running at 3.5 GHz) are sufficient
to provide high fidelity for test results in this paper.
The measurements from the RTDS simulator are transmitted
through a GTNETx2 card and sent to the MGCC via a commu-
nication network. The GTNETx2 card can either receive data
from the RTDS and send it to external equipment, or it can
receive data from the network and send it back to the RTDS,
depending on whether the GTNETx2 card was designed to be
in sending or receiving mode. The MGCC runs on a remote
server, which can receive load measurements from and send
signals back to RTDS with a 1 Gbps Ethernet connection.
The high-level design of the testbed is illustrated in Fig. 4.
Two GENETx2 cards are utilized for the purpose of network
communication. It should be noted that, although only one
quantum channel is established in this case, the principle can
be easily extended to cases with multiple quantum channels.
GTNETx2 card #2 is used to transmit data from the RTDS
to the MGCC, which models the classical communication
(represented in 1 in Fig. 4) in real-time, i.e., collecting load
measurements to MGCC as shown in Fig. 1. When the data is
received by the MGCC, an analysis of the data is conducted,
and proper control signals are sent to the local controller.
Before a control signal is sent out, a key with the same length
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Fig. 4. High-level design of the quantum-secure microgrid testbed.
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Fig. 5. The network connection of key components in the RTDS simulator
and a flow chart of the algorithm running in the MGCC.
is extracted from the key pool. This process (repre ented in
2 in Fig. 4) succeeds only when there are enough key bits in
the key pool.
GTNETx2 card #1 is utilized to receive signals from the
MGCC (represented in 3 in Fig. 4) and transfer them to the
RTDS. The simulation results with the updated control signals
are demonstrated in RSCAD. Note that the QKD system is
modeled through an algorithm formulated from (1)-(12). Keys
are continuously generated by the QKD algorithm, and are
stored in a key pool. This real-time communication between
the RTDS microgrid simulator and the MGCC using the QKD
algorithm is the salient feature of this testbed.
B. QKD-Based Microgrid Communication Network
The network connection of key components in the RTDS
simulator and a flow chart of the algorithm running in the
MGCC are illustrated in Fig. 5. As shown on the left side of
Fig. 5, each RTDS rack is connected to one or more GTNETx2
cards using fiber optic cables. All the GTNETx2 cards are
connected with an edge switch through Ethernet cables to
transmit and receive data over the network. The User Datagram
Protocol (UDP) is used in our simulation.
From the MGCC side, as shown on the right side of Fig. 5,
the server enters the listening mode after being connected to
the simulator. At this stage, the server is receiving any UDP
packet whose destination IP and port match those of the server,
respectively. Once a packet arrives, a quantum key with the
same length of the received data, i.e., 64 bits in this paper, is
extracted from the key pool, and corresponding control signals
are generated. The server then enters the sending mode and
starts to send out control signals whose destination IP and
port are the IP and port of GTNETx2 card #1 in the RTDS
simulator (see Fig. 4), respectively. After controller signals are
sent out, the server goes back to the listening mode.
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C. Microgrid Modeling and Simulation
A typical microgrid system shown in Fig. 6 is used to
evaluate the performance of the QKD-enabled quantum-secure
microgrid in this study. This system is based on a medium-
voltage microgrid from [27] with a battery and communication
channels added. The buses within the microgrid are rated at
13.2 kV, and the microgrid is connected to the 138 kV main
grid through a 138/13.2 kV transformer and a circuit breaker.
The microgrid can operate either in islanded mode or in grid-
connected mode depending on the state of the circuit breaker.
The transformer is ∆ − Y connected and rated at 25 MVA
with a 8% impedance.
The DERs in the microgrid include a 5.5 MVA diesel
generator, a 1.74 MW PV system, and a 2 MW doubly-fed
induction generator wind turbine system. The diesel generator
uses the droop control to regulate the microgrid frequency in
islanded operation and to provide real and reactive powers
in both grid-connected and islanded modes. The PV system
and wind turbine both use the MPPT control to maximize their
power outputs. Three switched capacitors are connected at bus
1 to facilitate voltage synchronization in the microgrid.
A lithium-ion battery storage is further connected at bus
2 to provide a backup power supply and store extra energy
when the microgrid is in islanded operation. The battery model
consists of 250 stacks connected in parallel with each one
having 250 cells in series. A single cell has a capacity of 0.85
AH, and the initial state of charge in a single cell is set at
85%. A P-Q control is designed to regulate the output power
of the battery, the value of which is determined by the real
and reactive power references transferred from the MGCC via
a communication channel. The initial values of the real and
reactive power references are both set at zero.
The resistance and inductance of a unit length of the lines
in the microgrid are 0.2322 Ω/km and 2.355×10−3 H/km,
respectively, and the lengths of the lines are given in Fig. 6.
For more details on the microgrid, readers are referred to [27].
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the QKD-
based microgrid communication with our hardware testbed.
The results include 1) a comparison of the performance with
different data transmission speeds, 2) the impact of cyberat-
tacks on the microgrid, 3) an evaluation of the key generation
speed under different fiber lengths and noise levels, 4) the
impact of receiver’s detection efficiency, and 5) an evaluation
of the KPS’s performance.
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A. Effect of Data Transmission Speed
Data transmission speed is a critical statistic in a QKD-
based microgrid. A speed larger than the key generation speed
can result in the exhaustion of key bits in a key pool, eventually
causing the failure of data communication.
We used Wireshark, a free and open-source packet analyzer,
to monitor traffic in the system. Specifically, two types of
packets were captured: the packets sent from the RTDS
(GTNETx2 #2) to the MGCC and from the MGCC to the
RTDS (GTNETx2 #1). The transmission speed of the two
types of packets were set as the same. Namely, once there
was a packet received by the MGCC, a packet was sent out
from the MGCC.
The impact of the data transmission speed is illustrated in
Fig. 7, where the fiber length L (between the MGCC and the
local controller) is set at 50 km. The other parameters are the
same as those in Table I. Each packet sent from the MGCC to
the RTDS consists of 64 binary bits, meaning that 64 key bits
are consumed from the key pool when a packet is sent out.
From Fig. 7, it can be observed that:
• The data transmission speed has a large impact on the
QKD-based microgrid. With the setting in Fig. 7, a speed
larger than 20 packets/second will lead to the exhaustion
of key bits in the key pool.
• The larger the data transmission speed, the sooner the
quantum bits will be consumed. With the setting in Fig. 7,
for a speed of 40 packets/second, the exhaustion lasts
around 100 seconds within the key generation period.
This long shortage can cause serious damage to microgrid
operations, as there is no key in the key pool for the
encryption and authentication of data messages.
B. Impact of Cyberattacks on the Microgrid
For either a classical communication or a quantum com-
munication system during the exhaustion of key bits, the
security of the system can be easily broken by an adversary
using quantum computers, leading to insecurity in both the
encryption and authentication of data messages. The data
messages sent from the MGCC to local controllers can thus
be intercepted, decrypted, falsified, re-encrypted, and re-sent
to local controllers by an adversary without being detected.
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Fig. 8. Voltage response of bus 1 with and without QKD.
To test the impact of a malicious control signal on the
microgrid system, the real power reference of the P-Q control
for the battery is changed from the initial value, 0, to -6 MW at
time t = 16 s during the islanded mode. The voltage response
of bus 1 before and after the attack is illustrated in Fig. 8 (a).
It shows that, 1) the magnitude of voltage gradually decreases;
2) the frequency also decreases; and 3) at time t = 59 s, the
system eventually collapses. However, if QKD is employed
and there are enough key bits in the key pool, it will be
impossible to break the encryption or authentication due to
the unconditional security of QKD, and thus no malicious
data can be injected. The normal voltage response of bus 1
in a QKD-based microgrid is illustrated in Fig. 8 (b).
C. Evaluation of Key Generation Speed under Different Fiber
Lengths and Noise Levels
The speed of quantum key generation determines the max-
imum data transmission speed in a QKD-based microgrid.
The larger the key generation speed, the higher the maximum
data transmission speed. However, it was unclear which levels
of key generation speed the QKD system could provide for
the microgrid under different conditions. In this subsection,
an evaluation of key generation speed under different fiber
lengths Ls and noise levels emiss, is provided. The noise can
be either natural or caused by an adversary. A strong attack
on the quantum optic equipment leads to a large emis.
The real-time simulation results are given in Fig. 9, where
L is set from 1 km to 80 km, emis is set from 5×10−4 to
9×10−4 with a step of 1×10−4, and each packet consists of
64 binary bits. The other parameters are the same as those in
Table I. Key generation speed is calculated as the fraction of
the generated key’s size ` (see (1)) and the time required.
It can be observed that:
• A small L exhibits great superiority over a large L under
the same emis, which gives valuable insights that the
MGCC and the local controller should be close to each
other in a QKD-based microgrid.
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Fig. 10. Quantum key generation speeds under different ηBobs.
• The key generation speed is sufficient with a small L and
a small emis. But, it decreases dramatically when emis
increases. A proper strategy therefore has to be carried
out to improve the system’s cyberattack resilience.
• Importantly, Fig. 9 gives valuable resources on which
levels the data transmission speed should be set at under
different Ls and emiss. With the setting in Fig. 9, any
data transmission speed that is below the corresponding
curve (with regards to a certain emis) in Fig. 9, will have
sufficient key bits in the key pool under that emis.
D. The Impact of Receiver’s Detection Efficiency
The detection efficiency of the receiver, ηBob, is critical in
a QKD system. Detection efficiency refers to the probability
that the receiver can successfully detect the photons, which is
largely determined by the quality of the detection devices.
The impact of ηBob is evaluated in our real-time testbed. The
results are illustrated in Fig. 10, where L is set at 5 km, 10
km, and 20 km, respectively; emis is set at 6×10−4, 7×10−4,
and 8×10−4, respectively; and ηBob is from 10% to 50% with
a step of 5%. The other parameters are the same as in Table I.
It can be seen that ηBob has a significant impact on
key generation speed. With a given L and a given emis, a
small increase of ηBob results in a great improvement of the
speed. This indicates that it is worth improving the quality of
detection devices in a QKD-based microgrid.
E. Evaluation of KPS Performance
The performance of the presented KPS strategy is evaluated
in our testbed. In this test case, two key pools are established
in the quantum algorithm, and each stores its quantum key bits
separately. The QKD parameters for the two key pools are set
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Fig. 11. Comparison results of the numbers of key bits in key pools #1 and
#2 with and without KPS.
as the same except that emis for key pool #1 is 8×10−4 to
simulate a strong attack, while emis for key pool #2 is 5×10−4
for a weak attack. The data transmission speed is set at 100
packets/second, where each packet consists of 64 bits.
For the KPS strategy, the threshold is set at 5,000 bits for
key pool #1, meaning that once the number of key bits in key
pool #1 is lower than 5,000, a given number (which is set at
20,000) of key bits will be shared from key pool #2.
The comparison results of the numbers of key bits in key
pools #1 and #2 with and without KPS are illustrated in
Fig. 11. It can be observed that:
• Without KPS, there is a shortage of key bits in key pool
#1. For instance, at time t = 17.56 s, the key bits in key
pool #1 are used up (see the black dashed line in Fig. 11
(a)), and the shortage lasts around 10.5 s until a certain
number of key bits are generated. Meanwhile, the key
bits in key pool #2 do not have shortage issues (see the
black dashed line in Fig. 11 (b)).
• With KPS, the shortage issues of key pool #1 are well
addressed. At time t = 16.79 s, the number of key bits
in key pool #1 is below the threshold, and immediately
20,000 key bits are added (see the red solid line in Fig. 11
(a)). Meanwhile, 20,000 key bits are deducted from key
pool #2 (see the red solid line in Fig. 11 (b)). But this
does not affect the normal operation of key pool #2, as
the minimum number of key bits in key pool #2 is still
above the threshold.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a real-time QKD-enabled microgrid
testbed implemented in RTDS. This testbed provides a re-
alistic cyber-physical testing environment in real time with
a simulated QKD algorithm integrated. This is an important
step towards constructing a real QKD system in microgrid in
practice. With this testbed, more research work could be done
in the future. Some examples include exploiting the feasibility
of more advanced and practical QKD protocols for microgrids,
evaluating the QKD-enabled microgrid’s performance under
more scenarios, and developing methods to further enhance
the cyberattack resilience of the QKD-enabled microgrid.
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